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Abstract
While belief functions may be seen formally as a generalization of probabilistic distributions,
the question of the interactions between belief functions and probability is still an issue in practice.
This question is difficult, since the contexts of use of these theory are notably different and the
semantics behind these theories are not exactly the same. A prominent issue is increasingly
regarded by the community, that is the management of the conflicting information. Recent
works have introduced new rules for handling the conflict redistribution while combining belief
functions. The notion of conflict, or its cancellation by an hypothesis of open world, seems by
itself to prevent a direct interpretation of belief function in a probabilistic framework. This paper
addresses the question of a probabilistic interpretation of belief functions. It first introduces and
implements a theoretically grounded rule, which is in essence an adaptive conjunctive rule. It
is shown, how this rule is derived from a logical interpretation of the belief functions by means
of a probabilistic multimodal logic; in addition, a concept of source independence is introduced,
based on a principle of entropy maximization.
Keywords: Belief Functions, Modal Logic, Probability, Entropy maximization
1 Introduction
In [2, 3], A. Dempster introduced an elegant modelling of imprecise probabilistic beliefs, which for-
mally implies a generalisation of probability, and a process for infering combinations of these beliefs.
This seminal work completed by G. Shafer [4] initiated the theory of belief functions for manipulat-
ing uncertain and imprecise information. However, while belief functions may be seen formally as a
generalization of probabilistic distributions, the question of the interactions between belief functions
and probability is still an issue in practice. Indeed, the contexts of use of these theory are notably
different implying slightly different semantics in background. On the one hand, belief functions may
deal with non technical sources of information, and as a consequence are also confronted inherently
to conflictual information. On the other hand, the contexts of use of probability and bayesian rea-
sonning are more technical and controlled, and prevent, for the most part, the issues of conflictual
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information. It is often necessary to map the belief information to the probabilistic information
for actual applications. As will be shown subsequently, some issue for a probabilistic interpretation
of belief function is implied by the notion of conflict between the sources, which is a product of
the conjunctive combination rule for fusing belief function. The conflict and the management of
the conflict in the combination rules are topics of increasing interest for the community Recent
works have proposed evolutions of the historical rule of Dempster and Shafer (DS) for managing
the conflict; Lefevre and al explicitely introduced this issue [9], and many rule constructions fol-
lowed [5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14]. Especially, Florea, Jousselme and al [8] proposed a family of rules which
is adaptive with the conflict level. In this case, there is an important idea: the redistribution policy
is now changing automatically as a function of the conflict. But this concern for the conflict is
not new, and are for example ingredients of the famous rules of Dubois&Prade [6, 7] or Yager [17].
The notion of conflict may be cancelled by an hypothesis of open world [15], but this open world
hypothesis does not map to the common formalisms of probability, and have to be interpreted. By
the way, the open world hypothesis does not prevent any practical consideration of the conflict [16]
implied by the interpretation of the belief put on the empty set.
This paper addresses the question of a probabilistic interpretation of belief functions. It is the con-
tinuation of reflexions done in [19,20], which introduced and implemented a theoretically grounded
rule, obtained by applying a principle of sources independence based entropy maximization. This
rule is in essence an adaptive conjunctive rule, where the conflict redistribution is automatically
derived from the considered independence principle. It is shown that this rule identifies to the
conjunctive rule in cases without conflict. This rule is an introduction to the definition and study
of a multimodal logic for modelling beliefs, since it is indeed derived from this logic by applying
the independence principle. We point out by means of the axiomatizations how the conflict may be
interpreted from the logical level.
This paper is divided in two parts. The first part introduces a methodology for computing combina-
tion rules, on the basis of an entropic principle for defining the independence between the sources.
It is started by a general discussion about belief functions in section 2. Section 3 settles a new
methodology for deriving the combination rule, based on an entropic notion of sensor independence.
Then, section 4 discusses about the properties of the new rule and the implementations. A small
example is considered as an illustration, but since the purpose of this paper is mainly theoretical,
these experimental aspects are not developped. The second part exposes the logical fundaments of
our methodology. Section 7 provides some logical backgrounds and introduces the definition of the
multimodal logic. In section 8, it is shown how a logical combination rule is derivable from the logic.
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In section 9, a non trivial model is defined, and properties concerning the probabilistic extension of
the logic are deduced. Belief combination rules are then derived theoretically from the logical rule,
by applying a maximization of the entropic information. Section 10 concludes.
Part I
A combination rule based on the entropy
maximization principle
2 Overview
2.1 Frame of discernment
In order to manipulate the information, it is necessary to have an algebraic representation of the
events of the system. Various structures [21, 23] have been introduced recently, and in the most
general case, distributive lattices may be used for this algebraic representation [23]. In this paper,
however, we will restrict our reflexion to Boolean algebras, and especially to power sets, which are
the historical and prominent structures used by the belief function community.
Definition 1 (frame of discernment). It is given a finite Boolean algabra B = (G,∩,∪,∼, ∅,Ω) and
a subset Θ ⊂ G of propositions, called frame of discernment, which generates G.1
The frame of discernment Θ is the set of basical known events of our model, and the Boolean al-
gebra B describes the logical interaction between the basical event of Θ. Subsequently, the notations
BΘ
∆
= B and GΘ
∆
= G are used, in order to mark the structures with their frames of discernment.
While this paper addresses the general case of Boolean structures, it is known that power sets are
sufficiently versatile structures, which may be equivalent representations of any finite Boolean al-
gebra, and may as well include as substructures some lattice structures, like hyperpower sets [21],.
Thus, a fundamental example of Boolean structure BΘ is the example of power sets.
Example 2 (power set). • The frame of discernment identifies to singletons of a set Ω, so that
Θ = {{ω}/ω ∈ Ω},
• The Boolean algebra BΘ identifies to the algebra of the subsets of Ω, so that GΘ = 2Ω, and
∩,∪,∼, ∅,Ω are respectiveley the set intersection, set union, set complement, the empty set
and the entire set Ω .
1Which means that G is the set of all propositions derived from ∅,Ω, the elements of Θ and the operators ∩,∪,∼ .
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2.2 Belief
2.2.1 Basic belief asignment
The information from different sources or expert is not reducible to the only logical representation.
Information of real life are typically uncertain and imprecise and come with an uncertainty degree,
or belief. In belief function theory, the basic belief assignment (bba) is a belief density, describing the
information intrinsic to each proposition. This intrinsic information is the fraction of information
of the proposition which is not inherited from connex propositions. There are two definitions of bba
related respectively to an open world or a closed world hypothesis.
Definition 3 (basic belief assignment). Being given a finite Boolean algebra BΘ = (GΘ,∩,∪,∼
, ∅,Ω), a basic belief assignment m to GΘ is a real valued function defined over GΘ such that:
∑
X∈GΘ
m(X) = 1 and m ≥ 0 ,
and:
Open world hypothesis: No other constraint,
Closed world hypothesis: m(∅) = 0 .
The theory of Transferable Belief Model, as defined by Smets [15], implements typically the open
world hypothesis. While the bba describes the information intrinsic to each proposition, the full
belief of a proposition is potentially the compilation of the basic beliefs connex to this proposition.
There is a pessimistic bound and an optimistic bound for the belief of a propostion, which are the
credibility and the plausibility.
Definition 4 (credibilty function). The cedibility Bel related to a bba m is defined for any X ∈ GΘ
by:
Bel(X) =
∑
Y ∈GΘ:∅(Y⊂X
m(Y ) =
∑
Y ∈GΘ:Y⊂X
m(Y )−m(∅) . (1)
The credibility is a pessimistic bound, only talking into account the belief of the propositions
known with certainty.
Definition 5 (plausibility function). The plausibility is defined by Pl(X) = 1 − Bel(∼ X) for any
X ∈ GΘ .
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2.3 Combination rules
A main contribution of the theory of belief functions consists in the combination rules. It is assumed
that two or more sources of information are providing a viewpoint about the universe. These
viewpoints are described by specific bba for each source. The question then is to make a unique
representation of the information, i.e. a unique bba, from these several bbas.
2.3.1 Conjunctive rule
The conjunctive rule belief functions is a rule of reference for combining belief functions with the
open world hypothesis. It is applied for fusing independent sources of information.
Definition 6 (conjunctive combination). Let m1 and m2 be 2 bbas over G
Θ . The conjunctive
combination m1 ⊕∩ m2 of m1 and m2 is defined by:
m1 ⊕∩ m2(X) =
∑
Y1,Y2∈GΘ:Y 1∩Y2=X
m1(Y1)m2(Y2) . (2)
It is proved that m1 ⊕∩ m2 is a bba when m1 and m2 are bbas. However, the quantity m1 ⊕∩
m2(∅) , called degree of conflict, is not necessary zero, even if both m1 and m2 meet the constraint
m1(∅) = m2(∅) = 0. Thus, ⊕∩ is an acceptable combination rule when the open world hypothesis is
made, like in the TBM, but it is not acceptable in general when the closed world hypothesis is done.
However, there are classes of bbas for which the conjunctive rule is admissible for the closed world
hypothesis, that is bbas restricted to Boolean substructures for which contradiction ∅ cannot be
derived from the conjunction ∩. In [21,25], Dezert and Smarandache proposed such a structure, the
hyperpower set. On such structure, the conjunctive rule does not generate conflict and is admissible
even with the closed world hypothesis.
2.3.2 Conflict management with the closed world hypothesis
In the general case, the conjunctive rule generates a degree of conflict, which is not complient with
the closed world hypothesis. While many rules are based on the conjunctive rule, a management of
the conflict is necessary and is implemented specifically by each rule.
Dempster-Shafer rule. The historical rule of Dempster-Shafer [3,4] is based on the conjunctive
rule, but handles the conflict as a normalization parameter.
Definition 7 (Dempster-Shafer). Let m1 and m2 be 2 bbas over G
Θ . The Dempster-Shafer combi-
nation m1 ⊕DS m2 of m1 and m2 is defined by:
m1 ⊕DS m2(X) =
I[X 6= ∅]m1 ⊕∩ m2(X)
1− Z
, (3)
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where Z = m1 ⊕∩ m2(∅) is the degree of conflict and:
I[X 6= ∅] = 1 if X 6= ∅ , and I[X 6= ∅] = 0 if X = ∅ .
Rules defined from a confict redistribution. Variety of rules have been proposed recently [5,
8, 10,11,13,14], especially based on a conflict redistribution [9]. We will not give here a description
of all these rules, but a principle of construction is proposed.
The principle is to construct a combination rule from the conjunctive rule by redistributing the
conflict. Being given a redistribution function r, it is defined the combination rule ⊕r by:
m1 ⊕ [r]m2(X) = m1 ⊕∩ m2(X) + r(X|m1,m2)m1 ⊕∩ m2(∅) , (4)
for any X ∈ GΘ . The redistribution function r should be typically such that:
r(∅|m1,m2) = −1 ,
∑
Y ∈GΘ
r(Y |m1,m2) = 0 , (5)
and:
r(X|m1,m2) ≥ 0 , for any X ∈ G
Θ \ {∅} . (6)
But there are examples of redistribution laws [8] where the constraint (6) is relaxed. However, in
this approach of Florea, Jousselme and al, the redistribution function is conditionned by the conflict
Z = m1 ⊕∩ m2(∅), which is a more specific conditionner than m1,m2
There are many possible rules deduced from the redistribution principle. Dempster-Shafer rule is
among these rules:
⊕DS = ⊕[rDS] where rDS(X|m1,m2) =
m1 ⊕∩ m2(X)
1− Z
, for any X ∈ GΘ \ {∅} .
In this case, the redistribution is proportionnal to the conjunctively fused belief.
The PCR5 (Proportional Conflict Redistribution no. 5) rule [13,14] is another rule deduced from a
redistribution of the conflict, i.e. ⊕PCR5 = ⊕[rPCR5] where:
rPCR5(X|m1,m2) =
1
Z

 ∑
Y ∈GΘ\{X}
m1(X)
m1(X) +m2(Y )
m1(X)m2(Y )
+
∑
Y ∈GΘ\{X}
m2(X)
m2(X) +m1(Y )
m1(Y )m2(X)

 .
for any X ∈ GΘ \ {∅} . Under that form, it appears clearly that PCR5 is based on a local conflict
redistribution, attributed proportionnaly to the input basic belief.
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The principle of conflict redistribution implies a potentially infinite variety of rules. The question
now is how to decide for a rule or another? This choice is certainly dependent of the structure of
the fusion problem. A theoretical criterion for such a choice is still an issue.
In the next sections, we derive a theoretically grounded ruling method, for which the conflict redis-
tribution is implied by a new concept of independence of the sources. The new rules are essentially
computed from an entropic optimization problem.
3 Entropic approach for the rule definition
To begin with this new rule concept, we directly settle the concrete optimization principles of our
method. The logical justification comes later in part II.
3.1 Independent sources and entropy
The idea is not completely new, and the entropy maximization principle has been linked to the
conjunctive rule in [25]. It is noticed, that ⊕∩ could be derived from an entropic maximization:
m1 ⊕∩ m2(X) =
∑
Y ∩Z=X
fo(Y,Z) , for any X ∈ G
Θ ,
where:
fo ∈ argmax
f
−
∑
Y,Z∈GΘ
f(Y,Z) ln f(Y,Z)
under constraints:
f ≥ 0 ,∑
Y ∈GΘ
f(Y,Z) = m2(Z) , for any Z ∈ G
Θ ,
∑
Z∈GΘ
f(Y,Z) = m1(Y ) , for any Y ∈ G
Θ .
(7)
Equation (7) has a particular interpretation in the paradigm of information theory: fo is the law
with maximal ignorance of the interaction between the marginal variables Y and Z, owing to the fact
that the marginal law arem1 andm2. By the way, independent sources of information should indeed
provide a maximal ignorance of interaction between the maginal variables, so that the maximization
of entropy appears as the good way to characterize independent sources. Since, in this case, the
constraints are limited to the marginalizations, the solution to this maximization is:
fo(Y,Z) = m1(Y )m2(Z) ,
where is recognized the joint law of two independent variables. The definition (7) works when
the open world hypothesis is done. But when the closed world is hypothesized, new constaints are
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implied and have to be added to the optimization problem. In regards to these considerations, a
generalization of the notion of independance between variables is introduced now, and will be used
for the definition of a new rule of combination.
3.2 Independance of constrained variables
Definition 8 (constrained independance). Let be given the variables X1:s defined over the finite
sets E1:s respectively. Let ρo be a probability density defined over the joint variable (X1:s) and let
ρ1:s be the marginals of ρo over the variables X1:s respectively. Let ~ϕ(·) be the constraint defined by
~ϕ : (ρ(X1:s))(X1:s)∈
∏
i=1:s Ei
7→ {false, true}M is a vectorial Boolean mapping defined on any joint
probability density ρ. Then, the variables X1:s are independant in regards to the probability density
ρo and to the constraint ~ϕ(·) ≥ ~0 if and only if ρo is the solution of the following optimization:
ρo ∈ argmax
ρ
∑
(X1:s)∈
∏
i=1:s Ei
−ρ(X1:s) ln ρ(X1:s) ,
with respect to :
ρ ≥ 0 ,
the marginality constraints :
∑
(X1:i−1)∈
∏
j=1:i−1 Ej
∑
(Xi+1:s)∈
∏
j=i+1:s Ej
ρ(X1:s) = ρi(Xi) ,
the constraint : ~ϕ(ρ) =
−−→
true .
(8)
It is noticed that this concept is dependent of the variables set. For example, it is not necessary
true that the variables of the subsequence Xi1 , · · · ,Xik are independant in regards to the constraints,
when X1:s are. There is an exception however, when there is no constraint, i.e. ~ϕ(ρ) is always
−−→
true.
In such a case, it is proven by applying Kuhn-Tucker theorem that ρ(X1:s) =
∏
i=1:s ρi(Xi) .
The notion of constrained independance is now applied to the definition of a combination rule; the
sets are Ei = G
Θ, and the constraint may be defined by ~ϕ = (ϕX1:s)X1:s∈GΘ , where:
ϕX1:s(ρ) = false if ρ(X1:s) > 0 and
⋂
i=1:s
Xi = ∅ ,
ϕX1:s(ρ) = true otherwise.
After simplification, this construction results in the following definition of the fusion rule.
3.3 Entropy maximizing rule for a closed world
Definition 9 (entropy maximizing rule). Let m1:s be s bbas defined on G
Θ, compliant with the
closed world hypothesis. The combination rule ⊕H, named Entropy Maximizing Rule (EMR), is
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defined by:
m1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H ms(X) =
∑
⋂
i=1:s Yi=X
fo(Y1:s) , for any X ∈ G
Θ ,
where:
fo ∈ argmax
f
−
∑
Y1:s∈GΘ
f(Y1:s) ln f(Y1:s)
under constraints:
f ≥ 0 ,∑
Y1:i−1,Yi+1:s∈GΘ
f(Y1:s) = mi(Yi) , for any i = 1 : s and Yi ∈ G
Θ ,
⋂
i=1:s
Yi = ∅ ⇒ f(Y1:s) = 0 , for any Y1:s ∈ G
Θ .
(9)
Corollary of the definition 10. ⊕H is compliant with the closed world hypothesis.
Conflict management. In the definition of rule ⊕H, the independence of the sources has been
implemented practically by an entropic maximization principle. From this principle, the confict
management is implied automatically. Nevertheless, the rule ⊕H is also able to reject the sources,
when they are considered as definitively non compatible. The fundamental incompatibility of the
sources is related to the feasibility of the constraints in (9).
A glimpse of the logical background. The definition of m1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H ms based on fo is the
expression of hypotheses on the logical background, which require some caution when applying
the rule. Especially, it is the joint result of a conservation of the beliefs during the combination
and of a logical independence hypothesis. The constraints in (9) are also the consequence of the
logical background. In particular, the constaint
⋂
i=1:s Yi = ∅ ⇒ f(Y1:s) = 0 is related to the
hypothesis that the sources are in coherence with the objective world. In the most general case, the
Belief functions may be used for fusing subjective information, and different logical background and
constraints should be considered for such information. However, the entropy maximization principle
may be combined with many kinds of constraints, and we have potentially a general principle for
defining rules.
4 Properties and implementation
This section is devoted to the development of basic properties of EMR and to practical implemen-
tation on examples. The following definitions and notations are used in this section.
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Definition 11 (probabilistic bba). A bba m is said to be probabilistic if there are propositions
X1, · · · ,Xn ∈ G
Θ \ {∅} such that:
n∑
j=1
m(Xj) = 1 and


i 6= j ⇒ Xi ∩Xj = ∅ ,
n⋃
j=1
Xj = Ω .
Moreover, when X1, · · · ,Xm are minimal non empty elements, that is:
Y ( Xi implies Y = ∅ for any i = 1 : n ,
then m is called a probability density over GΘ and the credibility Bel related to m is called the
probability measure on GΘ derived from m.
Notations. Subsequently, m1, · · · ,ms are bbas on G
Θ compliant with the closed world hypothesis.
It is denoted by Beli ⊕H Belj the credibility function related to mi ⊕H mj . It is denoted by ρ a
probability density over GΘ and by P the probability measure on GΘ derived from ρ .
Now, we have first to explain some notions about belief sharpening and its converse, belief weakening.
Belief weakening is commonly used by the community, especially when a reliability degree of the
information is taken into account. These notions are introduced now, with some refinements. They
are necessary subsequently.
4.1 Belief sharpening
Definition 12 (belief sharpening). A sharpening fromm1 tom2 is a mapping r12 : G
Θ×GΘ −→ IR ,
such that r12 ≥ 0 , and:
•
∑
Y ∈GΘ
r12(X,Y ) =
∑
Y :Y⊆X
r12(X,Y ) = m1(X) , for any X ∈ G
Θ ,
•
∑
X∈GΘ
r12(X,Y ) =
∑
X:Y⊆X
r12(X,Y ) = m2(Y ) , for any Y ∈ G
Θ .
It is noticed that this definition implies:
r12(X,Y ) = 0 for any (X,Y ) ∈ (G
Θ ×GΘ) such that Y 6⊆ X . (10)
A sharpening will move the basic belief from propositions to subpropositions, thus resulting in a
more accurate assignment of the basic belief. We will also say that m2 is a sharpening of m1,
or conversely that m1 is a weakening of m2 , when exists a sharpening from m1 to m2 . We will
equivalently write the ⊳ relation for credibility functions:
Bel1 ⊳ Bel2
∆
⇐⇒ m1 ⊳m2 .
It is noticed that the sharpening implies an order relation on belief functions.
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Property 13 (equivalence relation). Define the relation ⊳ on belief functions by:
Bel1 ⊳ Bel2 if and only if there is a sharpening r12 from Bel1 to Bel2 .
Then, the relation ⊳ is an order relation, and in particular:
⊳ is transitive. If r12 and r23 are sharpenings respectively from Bel1 to Bel2, and from Bel2 to
Bel3 , then r13 defined by:
2
r13(X1,X3)
∆
=
∑
X2∈GΘ
r12(X1,X2)r23(X2,X3)
m2(X2)
, (11)
is a sharpening from Bel1 to Bel3 ,
⊳ is reflexive. More precisely, there is only one sharpening r from Bel to Bel , which is defined by
r(X,X) = m(X) and r(X,Y ) = 0 for any X,Y ∈ GΘ such that Y 6= X ,
⊳ is antisymmetric. If r12 and r21 are sharpenings respectively from Bel1 to Bel2, and from Bel2
to Bel1 , then:
r12(X,X) = r21(X,X) = m1(X) = m2(X) and r12(X,Y ) = r21(X,Y ) = 0 ,
for any X,Y ∈ GΘ such that X 6= Y .
Proof is done in appendix A.
Property 14. Bel1 ⊳ Bel2 implies Bel1 ≤ Bel2 .
Proof is done in appendix A. The converse is false.
Example 15 (counterexample). Assume:
GΘ = {∅, A,B,C,A ∪B,B ∪ C,C ∪A, ∅} ,
and define:
m1(A ∪B) = m1(B ∪ C) = 0.5 = m2(B) = m2(Ω) .
It is obvious that Bel1 ≤ Bel2, but it is also clear that Bel1 6⊳ Bel2 .
Property 16. Probability measures are minimal for ⊳. More precisely:
P ⊳ Bel implies P = Bel .
The result is a direct consequence of the definitions.
2Since r12(X1, X2) ≤ m2(X2) and r23(X2, X3) ≤ m2(X2) , it is noticed that (11) is well defined by setting
r12(X1,X2)r23(X2,X3)
m2(X2)
∆
= 0 when m2(X2) = 0 .
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4.2 Properties of EMR
Property 17 (commutativity). Let σ : [[1, s]]→ [[1, s]] be a permutation on [[1, s]]. Then:
m1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H ms exists if and only if mσ(1) ⊕H · · · ⊕Hmσ(s) exists ,
and:
m1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H ms = mσ(1) ⊕H · · · ⊕H mσ(s) .
The result is a direct consequence of the definitions.
Property 18 (neutral element). Define the bba of total ignorance ν by ν(Ω) = 1 . Then:
m1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H ms ⊕H ν exists if and only if m1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H ms exists ,
and:
m1 ⊕H · · · ⊕Hms ⊕H ν = m1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H ms .
Proof is given in appendix A.
Property 19 (conservation of belief). Assume that m1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H ms exists. Then:
Beli ⊳ Bel1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H Bels for any i = 1 : s . (12)
Proof is given in appendix A.
Corollary 20.
Bel1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H Bels ≥ max
i=1:s
Beli .
Corollary 21. Let X1, · · · ,Xn ∈ G
Θ be such that Xi ∩Xj = ∅ for any i 6= j . Then:
The existence of m1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H ms implies
n∑
j=1
max
i=1:s
Beli(Xj) ≤ 1 .
This result is a sufficient criterion for proving the non-existence of m1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H ms.
Property 22 (combination of dominated belief functions). Assume that Beli ⊳Bel for any i = 1 : s .
Then Bel1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H Bels exists.
Proof. Let ri be a sharpening from Beli to Bel, for i = 1 : s. Since ri(Xi,X) ≤ m(X), it is set:
m(X)1−s
∏
i=1:s
ri(Xi,X)
∆
= 0 when m(X) = 0 .
Then, define:
f(X1:s) =
∑
X∈GΘ
m(X)1−s
∏
i=1:s
ri(Xi,X) .
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From the definition of ri(Xi,X), it is clear that:
∏
i=1:s
ri(Xi,X) = 0 when X 6⊂
⋂
i=1:s
Xi .
As a consequence of this and of m(∅) = 0, it comes that:
m(X)1−s
∏
i=1:s
ri(Xi,X) = 0 when
⋂
i=1:s
Xi = ∅ .
Then: ⋂
i=1:s
Xi = ∅ implies f(X1:s) = 0 .
Now, it is also derived:∑
X1:i−1,Xi+1:s
f(X1:s) =
∑
X∈GΘ
ri(Xi,X)m(X)
1−s
∏
j=1:i−1,i+1:s
∑
Xj∈GΘ
rj(Xj ,X)
=
∑
X∈GΘ
ri(Xi,X)m(X)
1−sm(X)s−1 =
∑
X∈GΘ
ri(Xi,X) = mi(Xi) .
Since it is also clear that f ≥ 0 , so there is a solution to the optimization (9).
Property 23 (probabilistic bound). EMR is coherent with the probabilistic bounds:
Beli ⊳ P, for any i=1:s, implies
{
Bel1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H Bels ⊕H P exists ,
Bel1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H Bels ⊕H P = P .
(13)
Proof is given in appendix A.
The interpretation of this result may not be obvious. It says that, when the sources of information
are weakenings of a probabilistic law, then their fusion with this law exists and confirms the law.
However, the fused bba Bel1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H Bels obtained from the sources Bel1:s alone is not necessary
compatible with a probability P such that Beli ⊳ P for any i = 1 : s . In particular:{
Beli ⊳ P, for any i=1:s, does not imply Bel1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H Bels ⊳ P ,
Beli ⊳ P, for any i=1:s, does not imply (Bel1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H Bels)⊕H P exists .
This result is an indirect consequence of the fact that ⊕H will add information by means of the
independence principle. This is illustrated by the following counterexample.
Example 24 (counterexample). Let m1, m2 and ρ be defined of over G
Θ:
GΘ = {∅, A,B,C,A ∪B,B ∪ C,C ∪A, ∅} ,
by: m1(A ∪B) = m2(A ∪B) = ρ(A) = m1(B ∪ C) = m2(B ∪ C) = ρ(C) = 0.5 .
It comes out that Bel1 ⊳ P and Bel2 ⊳ P by redistributing the masses from A ∪ B to A and from
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B ∪ C to C. Since the combination does not generate any conflict, then m1 ⊕H m2 coincides with
m1 ⊕∩ m2 so that:
m1 ⊕H m2(A ∪B) = m1 ⊕H m2(B ∪ C) = 0.25 and m1 ⊕H m2(B) = 0.5 .
Obviously, Bel1⊕HBel2 6⊳P and (Bel1⊕HBel2)⊕HP does not exists, since otherwise (m1⊕Hm2)⊕H
ρ(X) ≥ 0.5 for X = A,B,C.
Property 25 (associativity). EMR is not associative.
The counterexample of section 23 turns out to be a counterexample for the associativity.
As a consequence, one have to distinguish between (m1 ⊕H m2) ⊕H m3, m1 ⊕H (m2 ⊕H m3) and
m1 ⊕H m2 ⊕H m3, this last one being a simultaneous combination of m1:3 .
Property 26 (idempotence). EMR is not indempotent, but it is proved:
m is probabilistic⇒ m⊕H · · · ⊕Hm = m . (14)
Proof is given in appendix A.
4.3 Algorithm
The optimization (9) is convex and is not difficult. However, its size increases exponentially. The
gradient of H(f) =
∑
X1:s
−f(X1:s) ln f(X1:s) is:
DfH(f) =
∑
X1:s
−(1 + ln f(X1:s)) df(X1:s) .
The following algorithm, based on the projected gradient, has been implemented:
1. Initialize t = 0 and the convergence step θ0,
2. Find a feasible solution f0 to the constraints of (9); a simplex is solved. If such a solution does
not exist, then stop: the combination is not possible. Otherwise, continue on next step.
3. Build ∆ft by solving the quadratic program:
min
∆ft
∑
X1:s
(θt(1 + ln ft(X1:s)) + ∆ft(X1:s))
2 ,
under constraints:
ft +∆ft ≥ 0 ,
∑
X1:i−1Xi+1:s
∆ft(X1:s) = 0 , for any i = 1 : s and any Xi
and
s⋂
i=1
Xi = ∅ ⇒ ∆ft(X1:s) = 0 for any X1:s .
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Table 1: Example of EMR implementation.
α1 γ1 β2 γ2 m = m1 ⊕m2
0.99 0.01 0.99 0.01 Rejection[Zadeh]
0.501 0 0.501 0 Rejection
0.499 0 0.499 0 m(a) = m(b) = 0.499 , m({a, b, c}) = 0.002
0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 m(a) = m(b) = 0.3 , m(c) = 0.175 , m({a, b, c}) = 0.225
0.3 0.05 0.3 0.05 m(a) = m(b) = 0.3 , m(c) = 0.09375 , m({a, b, c}) = 0.30625
0.3 0.01 0.3 0.01 m(a) = m(b) = 0.3 , m(c) = 0.01975 , m({a, b, c}) = 0.38025
4. If H(ft +∆ft) < H(ft), then set θt+1 = θt/2 and ft+1 = ft ,
5. Else set ft+1 = ft +∆ft,
6. Set t := t+ 1 and reiterate from step 3 until full convergence.
4.4 Experimentation
We will consider the fusion of m1 and m2 defined on the power set of {a, b, c} by:{
m1(a) = α1 , m1(c) = γ1 , m1({a, b, c}) = 1− α1 − γ1 ,
m2(b) = β2 , m2(c) = γ2 , m2({a, b, c}) = 1− β2 − γ2 .
Notice that Zadeh’s example is a subcase where defined by α1 = β2 = 0, 99 and γ1 = γ2 = 0.01 .
The table 1 summarize the results of combnation by ⊕H for various cases. These examples express
clearly the property of belief conservation, and the capacity of EMR to reject any combination which
is not compatible with this property.
5 Conclusion
The rule EMR is a theoretically grounded combination rule, defined on the basis of:
• constraints expressing the belief conservation, which is a desirable property,
• an hypothesis of sources independence, which is generalized by means of a principle of infor-
mation maximization.
The good news is that such a rule exists. Especially, it is complient with the probabilistic bound
property as expressed in section 23. The bad news is that such a rule is quite constraining and
cannot be associative. Here comes a fundamental point related to the use of the hypothesis of
independence. This hypothesis introduces information which may imply some conflicts with the
ground truth expressed by means of a probability of reference P . The properties of sections 22
(combination of dominated belief functions) and 23 express that. More precisely, it is possible to
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combine as many sources of information (even P itself!) which is compatible with P , so as to make
the best approximation of P :
Beli ⊳ P, for any i=1:s, implies Bel1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H Bels exists .
But as soon as the rule has been applied, the introduction of information by means of the indepen-
dence principle may implies conflicts with the ground truth:
Beli ⊳ P, for any i=1:s, does not imply Bel1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H Bels ⊳ P .
This finding leads us to question about the hypotheses of implementation of belief combination rules,
at least in the context of a closed universe. We could give up with the property of belief conservation:
this is actually what most rules do in practice, when redistributing the conjunctive conflict. We could
resign ourself to implement the combination rule just as a final step of the fusion process, as this is
suggested by the properties of EMR. However, such approach is practically impossible in regards to
the combinatorics. But there is perhaps a third way: we could manipulate conditionnal propositions
instead of absolute propositions, as is usually done: conditional propositions are efficient tools for
handling the independence hypotheses. Conditionnal beliefs are not a new concept; the theoretical
tools exist. Such an approach would lead to define some forms of reasoning similar to the Bayesian
reasoning.
Part II
A multimodal logic for modelling beliefs
Part I introduced the rule EMR by applying a principle of sources independence based on a maxi-
mization of the information. While the resulting optimization (9) appears as a natural extension in
regards to the conjunctive rule, this problem and especially its constraints have not been justified
clearly. The prupose of this second part is to address the question of belief combination from a
logical point of view. Based on this logical interpretation, the definition (9) is implied.
6 Belief functions, modality and probability
Belief functions may be seen as a generalization of probabilistic distributions by combining im-
precisions within the uncertainty. Belief functions are caracterized by the notion of basic belief
assignment which will assign a basic belief to any element of the Boolean algebra. In this way, bbas
may be seen as a generalization of probabilistic densities, which assign probabilistic densities to the
minimal elements of the Boolean algebra. This difference implies the ability of belief functions for
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manipulating imprecise information. It has also an algebraic consequence, by replacing the additiv-
ity property by the sub-additivity property. The qualification of belief functions as a generalization
of probabilities has been questionned, by arguing that belief functions were subcases of random sets.
While this is true in some manner, an elementary interpretation of this theory by means of random
sets is not able to seize some semantic subtilities behind belief functions.
However, there is another way to concile probabilities and belief functions. This could be done by
introducing the semantic at a logical level. While probabilities are constructed on a classical logical
framework (Boolean algebras), it is still possible to implement probabilities on a non classical logic,
and this how we will interpret belief functions. In [26], Ruspini derived a logical counterpart of the
credibility function by means of an epistemic operator K representing the knowledge of the source
of information. This operator was in fact related to the modal operator of system S5. He proposed a
logical counterpart of basic belief assignment, i.e. the epistemic proposition denoted e(X), derived
from logical combinations of the modal propositions as follows:
e(X) = KX \
⋃
Y⊂X;Y 6=X
KY . (15)
Subsequently, an equivalent construction is proposed on the basis of a multimodal logic. In our
model, Beli(X), the credibility of X according to sensor i, is interpreted as the probability P ([i]X ∧
¬[i]⊥) of the modal proposition [i]X ∧ ¬[i]⊥ .
Ruspini also introduced the principle of a logical combination rule:
e(X) =
⋃
Y ∩Z=X
[e1(Y ) ∩ e2(Z)] . (16)
This combination rule is in fact an immediate consequence of an elaborated axiom directly inspired
from the conjunctive combination rule formulated on the credibility functions:
KX is true ⇐⇒ there is Y,Z such that Y ∩ Z ⊆ X and K1Y,K2Z are true. (17)
Subsequently, we will go a step further in this way by deriving the logical combination rule (16)
from axioms of a multimodal logic. These axioms will be related to elementary properties of our
deduction system.
From (16), Ruspini derived back Dempster-Shafer combination by applying the property P (e1(Y )∩
e2(Z)) = P (e1(Y ))P (e2(Z)) , which depicts a rough independence hypothesis of the sources. Since
e1(Y ) ∩ e2(Z) = ∅ whenever Y ∩ Z = ∅, this approach generates conflict and needs a normalization
of the combination rule. In particular, it is possible to have P (∅) > 0 ; this is clearly not satisfying
from a logical viewpoint.
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Again, we will go further with this idea of Ruspini, but, this time, by implementing our principle
of sources independence based on the information maximization. This principle takes care of the
logical exclusions. Nevertheless, we will also handle the distinction between the open world and
the closed world, by considering different axioms. Especially, closed worlds will be such that the
modalities of the contradiction are necessarily a contradiction, i.e. [i]⊥ ≡ ⊥ , while open worlds will
accept a relaxation of this constraint.
7 Definition of a multimodal logic
This section introduces a multimodal logic which is the backbone for a logical interpretaion of the
rule EMR. This logic has been previously introduced in [18].
7.1 Language definition
It is defined a finite set, P, called the set of atomic propositions. Atomic propositions of P are
denoted p, q, r, · · · For simplicity, it will be assumed subsequently that the atomic propositions de-
scribe a partition, that is the conjunction of different atomic propositions is the contradiction and
the disjunction of all atomic propositions is a tautology. Although these strong hypotheses depart
from usual axiomatization of classical logic, it is not a restriction, since it is known that is possible
to construct a free Boolean algebra by means of a power set.
It is defined the finite set I = {1, · · · , n}, describing n sources of information.
Definition 27 (classical propositions). The set LC of classical propositions is defined recursively
by ⊥ ∈ LC , P ⊆ LC and X → Y ∈ LC for any X,Y ∈ LC .
The classical propositions describe the logical information on the real world.
Definition 28 (simple modal propositions). The set LC[C] of simple modal propositions are defined
recursively by ⊥ ∈ LC[C] , P ⊆ LC[C] , X → Y ∈ LC[C] for any X,Y ∈ LC[C] , and [J ]X ∈ LC[C] for
any X ∈ LC and any non empty J ⊆ I .
In LC[C], modalities are only applied to classical propositions, resulting in a language free of
nested modalities. This language contains all necessary elements for defining the belief reasonning
at a logical level. Nevertheless, it is not closed under the modal operators, and the language of all
modal propositions is prefered for this logical study.
Definition 29 (modal propositions). The set L of modal propositions is defined recursively by
⊥ ∈ L , P ⊆ L , X → Y ∈ L for any X,Y ∈ L , and [J ]X ∈ L for any X ∈ L and any non empty
J ⊆ I .
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Propositions of L are denoted X,Y,Z, · · · It is noticed that the empty modality [∅]X is not
defined in L . The modal propositions describe the logical information according to the sources of
information. Subsequently, the modal operator [J ] describes logically the information received and
interpreted by the set J of sources of information working conjointly. Practically, we are essentially
interested by the information on the classical propositions, so that, although we authorize nested
modal propositions like [J ][K]X, we will not deal with them in practice.
The abbreviations ¬X
∆
= X → ⊥ , X ∨ Y
∆
= ¬X → Y , X ∧ Y
∆
= ¬(X → ¬Y ) , ⊤
∆
= ¬⊥ are used, for
any J ⊆ I and X,Y ∈ L . The dual of [J ]X is defined as <J> X
∆
= ¬[J ]¬X .
A multimodal logic is defined subsequently, by means of axioms and deductions rules. A proposition
which is deduced from these axioms and rules is called a theorem. The following definition will be
usefull subsequently:
Definition 30. For any finite set of propositions E ⊂ L, it is defined:
vE =
∨
X∈E
X . (18)
is often used subsequently.
Definition 31 (logical equivalence). The logical equivalence ≡ is defined by:
X ≡ Y if and only if X → Y and Y → X are theorems.
7.2 Axioms.
The multimodal logic is defined by the following rules and axioms defined for any propositions
X,Y ∈ L and subsets J,K ⊆ I :
Classical axioms.
Atomic propositions form a partition. vP is an axiom and (p ∧ q) → ⊥ is an axiom , for any
atomic propositions p, q ∈ P such that p 6= q ,
Modus ponens. If X and X → Y are theorems, then Y is a theorem ,
Modal rules and axioms:
N . If X is a theorem, then [J ]Y is a theorem ,
K. [J ](X → Y )→ ([J ]X → [J ]Y ) is an axiom ,
T . [J ]X → X is an axiom (optional),
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Inc. [J ]X → [J ∪K]X is an axiom ,
Ind. Let E ⊆ P be a subset of atomic propositions. Using the notation (18), the following
proposition is an axiom:
[J ∪K]vE →
∨
F,G ⊆ P
F ∩G ⊆ E
(([J ]vF ) ∧ ([K]vG)) .
The hypothesis, that atomic propositions form a partiotion, is used for simplicity. On the first
hand, it allows the introduction of general Boolean structures and not only free Boolean structures
for characterizing the model of the world. On the second hand, it makes much more simple the
definition of axiom Ind as well as the subsequent definition of the basic logical assignment. The
rule N and axiom K are minimal requirements of modal systems, and express that the sources
are logically coherent. The axiom T is optional and expresses that the sources provide information
which are coherent with the ground truth. We will see that this axiom is in relation with the closed
world hypothesis. The axiom Inc expresses that the sources are always contributing positively to the
global knowledge. Incidentally, this axiom also expresses that the sources are working in coherence
with each other at a the logical level. The axiom Ind expresses at the logical level that the sources
are contributing independently to the global knowledge of the classical propostions, that is the joint
knowledge [J ∪K]X does not contains more information than the disjoint knowledges [J ]Y ∧ [K]Z,
where X,Y,Z are classial propositions such that (Y ∩ Z)→ X .
It is assumed subsequently that the reader is familiar with classical propositional logic and its main
results. Some results are recalled subsequently about the logical equivalence.
7.3 Logical equivalence
Owing to the axioms and rules of classical logic, ≡ is an equivalence relation on the propositions of
L. The equivalence class of a proposition X ∈ L for the logical equivalence is denoted ⌊X⌋. Let
F ⊆ L . The set of equivalence classes of propositions X ∈ F is also denoted ⌊F ⌋ .
The logical operators are naturally infered on the classes of propositions. For example, it is defined
⌊X⌋ ∧ ⌊Y ⌋
∆
= ⌊X ∧ Y ⌋ , [J ]⌊X⌋
∆
= ⌊[J ]X⌋ ,. . . An order relation is also defined over ⌊L⌋.
Definition 32 (logical order).
⌊X⌋ ⊆ ⌊Y ⌋ if and only if X → Y is a theorem.
The notation ⌊X⌋ ( ⌊Y ⌋ is used when ⌊X⌋ ⊆ ⌊Y ⌋ and ⌊X⌋ 6= ⌊Y ⌋ .
Owing to the axioms, there is an morphism between 2P and ⌊LC⌋. :
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Definition 33 (morphism). For any classical proposition X ∈ LC , it is defined pX be the set of
atomic propositions such that ⌊p⌋ ⊆ ⌊X⌋.
pX = {p ∈ P / ⌊p⌋ ⊆ ⌊X⌋} . (19)
Property 34 (morphism). Any classical proposition is equivalent to proposition vpX :
∀X ∈ LC , ⌊X⌋ = ⌊vpX⌋ .
For any E,F ⊆ P , it is also derived:
(vE) ∧ (vF ) ≡ v(E ∩ F ) , (vE) ∨ (vF ) ≡ v(E ∪ F ) . and ¬vE ≡ v(P \ E) .
These are clear consequences of classical propositional logic.
8 Deriving the combination rules
8.1 Preliminary results
Some useful logical theorems are now derived. These theorems are deduced without the help of the
optional axiom T .
Property 35 (modality is non-decreasing).
If X → Y is a theorem, then [J ]X → [J ]Y is a theorem. . (20)
This result is a direct consequence of N and K .
Property 36 (modality and conjunction).
([J ]X ∧ [J ]Y ) ≡ [J ](X ∧ Y ) . (21)
This result is a consequence of the theorems (X∧Y )→ X , (X∧Y )→ Y , X → (Y → (X∧Y )) ,
N and K.
Property 37 (modality and disjunction).
([J ]X ∨ [J ]Y )→ [J ](X ∨ Y ) is a theorem. (22)
This result is a consequence of the theorems X → (X ∨ Y ) , Y → (X ∨ Y ) , N and K.
Property 38 (conjunction of heterogeneous modalities).
([J ]X ∧ [K]Y )→ [J ∪K](X ∧ Y ) . (23)
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Deduced from theorems [J ]X → [J ∪K]X and [K]Y → [J ∪K]Y , derived from Inc.
Property 39 (disjunction of heterogeneous modalities).
([J ]X ∨ [K]X)→ [J ∪K]X . (24)
Immediate consequence of Inc.
8.2 Logical combination rule
8.2.1 Preliminary definitions
The notion of partition will be useful for defining the logical combination.
Definition 40 (partition). A set of propositions, Π ⊆ L is a partition of ⊤ if it satisfies:
• The propositions of Π are exclusive : X ∧ Y ≡ ⊥ for any X,Y ∈ Π such that X 6= Y ,
• The propositions of Π are exhaustive:
∨
X∈ΠX ≡ ⊤ .
Notice that Π may contain ⊥, in this definition. The following property is a direct consequence
of the definition.
Property 41. Let Π and Λ be two partitions of ⊤. Then:
•
( ∨
X∈A
X
)
∧ ¬
( ∨
X∈B
X
)
≡
∨
X∈A\B
X , for any A,B ⊆ Π ,
• X1 ∧ Y1 ≡ X2 ∧ Y2 and (X1, Y1) 6= (X2, Y2) imply X1 ∧ Y1 ≡ X2 ∧ Y2 ≡ ⊥ ,
for any X1, Y1 ∈ Π and X2, Y2 ∈ Λ ,
• The set of joint propositions Γ = {X ∧ Y / X ∈ Π and Y ∈ Λ} is a partition.
(25)
8.2.2 Logical combination
Principle of the logical combination. Let J,K ⊆ I be sources subsets, and X be any classical
proposition. Arises the following issue: How to characterize the fused information [J ∪K]X from
the primary information [J ]X and [K]X . In order to solve this question, we introduce first the
notion of basic logical assignments (bla) which constitute the elementary logical components of the
information.
Definition 42 (basic logical assignments). Let E ⊆ P The basic logical assignment (bla) related to
the classical proposition vE and to sources subset J is the modal proposition (J)vE defined by:
(J)vE
∆
= [J ]vE ∧ ¬

 ∨
F(E
[J ]vF

 . (26)
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The bla (J)vE is the logical information, which the sources of set J attribute to proposition vE
intrinsically. The information of (J)vE cannot be attributed to classical propositions smaller than
vE. From the morphism property 34, the definition extends to ⌊LC⌋ :
Definition 43 (bla on classes). For any ⌊X⌋ ∈ ⌊LC⌋ , the basic logical assignment for ⌊X⌋ is defined
by (J)⌊X⌋
∆
= (J)⌊vpX⌋ . The bla (J)⌊X⌋ is also alternatively defined by:
(J)⌊X⌋ = [J ]⌊X⌋ ∧ ¬

 ∨
⌊Y ⌋∈⌊LC⌋:⌊Y ⌋(⌊X⌋
[J ]⌊Y ⌋

 . (27)
The blas have interesting properties, which will imply the definition of a logical combination.
Property 44 (exclusivity). The blas (J)vE, where E ⊆ P, are exclusive:
∀E,F ⊆ P , E 6= F ⇒ (J)vE ∧ (J)vF ≡ ⊥ . (28)
Proof is given in appendix B.
Property 45 (exhaustivity). The blas (J)vE, where E ⊆ P, are exhaustive:
∨
F⊆E
(J)vF ≡ [J ]vE , and in particular:
∨
F⊆P
(J)vF ≡ ⊤ . (29)
Proof is given in appendix B.
Corollary 46 (inversion). It is possible to define [J ]⌊X⌋ from the blas (J)⌊Y ⌋ :
∨
[J ]⌊X⌋=⌊Y ⌋∈⌊LC⌋:⌊Y ⌋⊆⌊X⌋
(J)⌊Y ⌋ , for any ⌊X⌋ ∈ ⌊LC⌋ . (30)
It is deduced from these results that bbas constitute partitions:
Corollary 47 (bla partition). The blas (J)vE, where E ⊆ P, constitute a partition of ⊤ .
Corollary 48 (joint bla partition). Let J,K ⊆ I. The propositions (J)vE ∧ (K)vF , where E,F ⊆
P, constitute a partition of ⊤ .
Based on these partitions, it is possible to express the logical combination:
Property 49 (computing the combination).
(J ∪K)vE ≡
∨
F∩G=E
((J)vF ∧ (K)vG) , for any E ⊆ P . (31)
Corollary 50.
(J ∪K)⌊X⌋ =
∨
⌊Y ⌋,⌊Z⌋∈⌊LC⌋:⌊Y ⌋∧⌊Z⌋=⌊X⌋
((J)⌊Y ⌋ ∧ (K)⌊Z⌋) , for any ⌊X⌋ ∈ ⌊LC⌋ . (32)
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The proof of the main property will apply the following lemma.
Lemma 51.
[J ∪K]vE ≡
∨
F∩G⊆E
([J ]vF ∧ [K]vG) ≡
∨
F∩G⊆E
((J)vF ∧ (K)vG) .
Proofs are given in appendix B.
Property 52 (generalized combination). The combination (32) happens to be associative and may
be extended to s sources:
(J1 ∪ · · · ∪ Js)⌊X⌋ =
∨
⌊Y1:s⌋∈⌊LC⌋:
∧
i=1:s ⌊Yi⌋=⌊X⌋
∧
i=1:s
(Ji)⌊Yi⌋ , for any ⌊X⌋ ∈ ⌊LC⌋ . (33)
8.2.3 Processus of logical fusion
As a conclusion, the fused sources J ∪K is computed from sources J and K as follows:
• Build (H)⌊X⌋ by means of (27) for H = J,K ,
• Compute (J ∪K)⌊X⌋ by means of (32)
• Derive [J ∪K]⌊X⌋ by means of (30),
for any ⌊X⌋ ∈ ⌊LC⌋ .
9 Model and consequences
In this section, a model is constructed for the logic. This model is not complete, when embeded
modalities are considered. However, if we restrict to the set of simple modal propositions, LC[C],
the model has some completude properties, which will be useful for deriving the belief combination
from the logical combination. The model is not based on a Kripke constuction.
9.1 Model
9.1.1 Definition
Two models are constructed for the logic respectively without and with the optional axiom T . The
models are quite similar, except for the minimal elements, denoted φ(· · ·). The elements φ(p0, E1:n)
are defined for any p0 ∈ P and any E1:n ⊆ P by:
• Without axiom T :
φ(p0, E1:n) = {(p0, E1:n)} , (34)
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• With axiom T :
φ(p0, E1:n) = {(p0, E1:n)} , if p0 ∈
n⋂
i=1
Ei ,
φ(p0, E1:n) = {} otherwise.
(35)
For any proposition p ∈ P , it is defined:
p =
⋃
E1:n⊆P
φ(p,E1:n) .
For any E ⊆ P , it is also defined: E =
⋃
p∈E p .
Then, the model X of any proposition X ∈ L is defined recursively by:
• p = p for any p ∈ P and ⊤ = P ,
• X ∧ Y = X ∩ Y , X ∨ Y = X ∪ Y and ¬X = ⊤ \X , for any X,Y ∈ L ,
• For any non empty J ⊆ I and X ∈ L, it is defined:
[J ]X =
⋃
p0∈P
⋃
EI\J⊆P
⋃
EJ⊆P:
⋂
j∈J Ej⊆X
φ(p0, E1:n) (36)
Other connectors are defined from ∨ , ¬ and [J ] , e.g. X → Y = ¬X ∨ Y and < J > X = ¬[J ]¬X .
Property 53 (classical propositions). Let X ∈ LC be a classical proposition. Then, it is clear from
the definition, that there is E ⊂ P such that X = E.
9.1.2 Interpretation
Subsequently, we are assuming X,Xi, Y ∈ LC and p ∈ P . It is assumed Ei ⊂ Xi such that Xi = Ei .
It is easily shown that:
p ∧
∧
i=1:n
(i)Xi = φ(p,E1:n) . (37)
In fact, it is implied from propositions (29) and (33) of the previous section that any combination of
non-nested modal propositions, like [J ]X withX ∈ LC , by means of classical operators (∧,∨,¬,→) is
equivalent to a disjunction of bla like
∧
i=1:n(i)Y with Y ∈ LC . As a consequence, any propositions
of LC[C], the set of simple modal propositions, is equivalent to a disjunction of propositions like
p ∧
∧
i=1:n(i)Xi . Now, in the case where axioms T also holds, it is easily derived that:
p ∧
∧
i=1:n
(i)vEi ≡ ⊥ , for any E1:n ⊆ P such that p 6∈
⋂
i=1:n
Ei ,
which is the logical counterpart of the definition of (35). It follows from these remarks that our
model (assuming that it fulfills actually the axioms) have completude property while restricted to
LC[C], so that:
⌊X⌋ = ⌊Y ⌋ if and only if X = Y , for any X,Y ∈ LC[C] . (38)
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In the case, where axiom T does hold, it is also noticed that the following characteristic constraints
is obtained for the simple modal propositions:
∧
i=1:s
Yi = ⊥ implies
∧
i=1:s
(Ji)⌊Yi⌋ = ⊥ , for any Y1:s ∈ LC . (39)
From the model definition, it is also clear that this constraint is sufficient to infer the consequence of
axiom T on the modal propostions. This discussion about the models is now completed by verifying
the axioms.
9.1.3 Axioms checking
The classical axioms are implied since the model is a power set. Other axioms are derived as follows.
Property 54 (axioms verification).
Partition:
∨
p∈P p = ⊤ and p ∧ q = ⊥ = ∅ , for p, q ∈ P such that p 6= q ,
N : [J ]⊤ = ⊤ ,
K: [J ](¬X ∨ Y ) ∩ [J ]X ⊆ [J ]Y , for any X,Y ∈ L ,
Inc: [J ](X) ⊆ [J ∪K]X , for any X,Y ∈ L ,
Ind: [J ∪K]vE ⊂
⋃
F,G ⊆ P
F ∩G ⊆ E
(
[J ]vF ∩ [K]vG
)
.
T : [J ](X) ⊆ X , when the model follows definition (35).
Proofs indications are given in appendix B.
9.2 From logical combination to belief combination
The interpretation of belief functions and belief combinations by means of modal propositions needs
the concept of probability over logical propositions.
Definition 55 (probability on logical propositions). Let ⌊F⌋ ⊂ ⌊L⌋ be a finite set of propositions
of ⌊L⌋ , closed under the classical operators ( i.e. → and ⊥ and derived operators). A probability
distribution over ⌊F⌋ is a mapping P : ⌊F⌋ → IR such that:
P ≥ 0 , P (⊤) = 1 and P (⌊X⌋) + P (⌊Y ⌋) = P (⌊X⌋ ∧ ⌊Y ⌋) + P (⌊X⌋ ∨ ⌊Y ⌋) .
Now, it is assumed s sensors characterized by the subsets J1:s ⊆ I , such that Ji ∩ Jj = ∅ for
any i 6= j . The logical framework ⌊F⌋ is then constructed as a classical closure of the sets of simple
[Ji]-modalities, i.e.:
{[Ji]⌊X⌋ / i = 1 : s, ⌊X⌋ ∈ ⌊LC⌋} ⊆ ⌊F⌋ , .
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The set ⌊F⌋ is a finite set. It happens from previous properties that the propositions
∧
i=1:s(Ji)⌊Yi⌋,
for ⌊Y1:s⌋ ∈ ⌊LC⌋, constitute a partition generating ⌊F⌋ and that [
⋃
i=1:s Ji] ⌊X⌋ ∈ ⌊F⌋ . It is then
possible to define the notion of belief, based on a probability defined over the framework ⌊F⌋ .
Definition 56 (belief as probabilistic modality). It is defined Beli(⌊X⌋)
∆
= P ([Ji]⌊X⌋)−P ([Ji]⌊⊥⌋)
and:
Bel1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H Bels(⌊X⌋) = P
([ ⋃
i=1:s
Ji
]
⌊X⌋
)
− P
([ ⋃
i=1:s
Ji
]
⌊⊥⌋
)
.
for i = 1 : s and for any ⌊X⌋ ∈ ⌊LC⌋ .
From this definition and the properties of (J), especially property (33), a definition of the bbas
and of their combinations is recovered.
Property 57 (logical definition of bba). mi(⌊X⌋) = P ((Ji)⌊X⌋) , and:
m1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H ms(⌊X⌋) =
∑
⌊Y1:s⌋∈⌊LC⌋:
∧
i=1:s ⌊Yi⌋=⌊X⌋
P
( ∧
i=1:s
(Ji)⌊Yi⌋
)
. (40)
In order to reduce P (
∧
i=1:s(Ji)⌊Yi⌋) , the independence of the disjoint sources J1:s is instru-
mental in a probabilistic paradigm. The idea is to compute P (
∧
i=1:s(Ji)⌊Yi⌋) by maximizing the
entropy of P over the logical framework ⌊F⌋:
P ∈ argmax
Q
∑
⌊Y1:s⌋∈⌊LC⌋
−Q
( ∧
i=1:s
(Ji)⌊Yi⌋
)
lnQ
( ∧
i=1:s
(Ji)⌊Yi⌋
)
,
u.c. Q ((Ji)⌊Yi⌋) = mi((Ji)⌊Yi⌋) for any i = 1 : s and ⌊Y1:s⌋ ∈ ⌊LC⌋ .
(41)
Combining (40) and (41), it becomes possible to derive m1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H ms from m1:s . Two cases
arise, which are consequences of the model constructed in previous section:
• Axiom T is removed. Then, it is possible to have
∧
i=1:s(Ji)⌊Yi⌋ 6= ⊥ even if
∧
i=1:s Yi = ⊥ ,
as seen in the model construction. As a consequence, the optimization implies the conjunctive
rule. We are in the hypothesis of an open world.
• Axiom T is used. As seen in the model construction, this axiom reduces in the constraint (39)
for the simple modal propositions. As a consequence, it is necessary to consider the constraint∧
i=1:s(Ji)⌊Yi⌋ = ⊥ , when
∧
i=1:s ⌊Yi⌋ = ⊥ . This results in the following implied constraint in
the optimization (41):
∧
i=1:s
⌊Yi⌋ = ⊥ implies Q
( ∧
i=1:s
(Ji)⌊Yi⌋
)
= 0 .
The rule EMR is thus derived, from a logical interpretation. Moreover, we are able to dis-
tinguish between the open and closed world hypotheses. From a modal point of view, the
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closed world (resp. open world) hypothesis means that [J ]⊥ → ⊥ is necessary (resp. is false
in general). From this modal interpretation, it appears, that the experts from an open world
may imply contradictions from factual information (typically because his knowledge of the real
world is not exhaustive).
10 Conclusion
A new combination rule have been defined for combining belief functions. This rule is derived
from a logical derivation, based on axioms of a multimodal logic, and from a principle of sources
independence, based on the maximization of the system entropy. This contribution implies a versatile
framework for defining the combination rules and their implied intuition. Indeed, it is possible to
derive many other logics for defining the notion of belief and their combination at a logical level.
In this contribution especially, we proposed a logic with strong but desirable properties, and we
derived some conlusions about the feasibility of the related combinations. These properties are
typically the conservation of belief during the combination, and the compliance with a probabilistic
ground truth. It appeared that such a rule is theoretically constructible. But however, it appeared
that as soon as the principle of independence is used, it introduces information which imply a bias
which is conflicting in general with the ground truth. This information should be used at the final
stage of the fusion, which is a strong constraint on the fusion process. We then questioned about the
need to release the principle of belief conservation (as do most rules with conflict redistribution) or
to abandon the compliance with a ground truth reference. We also suggested that these issues may
be solved by using conditional belief functions more thoroughly instead of absolute belief functions.
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A Proofs of section 4
For the sake of simplicity, somes proofs are done for s = 1 or s = 2. But these results are easily generalized
to s ≥ 1 sources.
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Belief sharpening – property 13 – ⊳ is an order relation.
Proof.
Proof of transitivity. Let r13 be defined according to (10).
Then, it is clear that r13 ≥ 0.
It also comes: ∑
X1∈GΘ
r13(X1, X3) =
∑
X2∈GΘ
r23(X2, X3)
m2(X2)
∑
X1∈GΘ
r12(X1, X2) =
∑
X2∈GΘ
r23(X2, X3)
m2(X2)
m2(X2) =
∑
X2∈GΘ
r23(X2, X3) = m3(X3) ,
and ∑
X3∈GΘ
r13(X1, X3) =
∑
X2∈GΘ
r12(X1, X2)
m2(X2)
∑
X3∈GΘ
r23(X2, X3) =
∑
X2∈GΘ
r12(X1, X2)
m2(X2)
m2(X2) =
∑
X2∈GΘ
r12(X1, X2) = m1(X1) .
Now, since r12(X1, X2) = 0 for any X1, X2 ∈ G
Θ such that X2 6⊆ X1, and r23(X2, X3) = 0 for any X2, X3 ∈
GΘ such that X3 6⊆ X2, it comes that r12(X1, X2)r23(X2, X3) = 0 for any X1, X2, X3 ∈ GΘ such that
X3 6⊆ X1 . As a consequence:
r13(X1, X3) = 0 for any X1, X3 ∈ G
Θ such that X3 6⊆ X1 ,
which also results in: ∑
X1∈GΘ
r13(X1, X3) =
∑
X1:X3⊆X1
r13(X1, X3) ,
and ∑
X3∈GΘ
r13(X1, X3) =
∑
X3:X3⊆X1
r13(X1, X3) .
Then, r13 is indeed an sharpening from Bel1 to Bel3 .
Proof of reflexivity.
The reflexivity itself is obvious, since r, defined by r(X,X) = m(X) and r(X,Y ) = 0 for any X,Y ∈ GΘ such
that X 6= Y , will check all requirements for a sharpening from Bel to itself.
Now, assume another sharpening r′ from Bel to itself. Then, there are propositions X ∈ GΘ such that
r′(X,X) < m(X) . Let XM ∈ GΘ be a maximal proposition, in regards to the order ⊆, such that
r′(XM , XM ) < m(XM ) . It comes from this definition:
r′(XM , XM ) < m(XM ) and r
′(X,XM ) = 0 ,
for any X ∈ GΘ \ {XM} such that XM ⊂ X . As a consequence:∑
X∈GΘ
r′(X,XM ) < m(XM ) ,
which is a contradiction with the hypothesis.
Proof of antisymmetry.
It comes from the transitivity that:
r11(X1, Y1) =
∑
X2∈GΘ
r12(X1, X2)r21(X2, Y1)
m2(X2)
is a sharpening from Bel1 to Bel1 . From the unicity of this sharpening, it comes:
∑
X2∈GΘ
r12(X1, X2)r21(X2, X1)
m2(X2)
= m1(X1) , (42)
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and ∑
X2∈GΘ
r12(X1, X2)r21(X2, Y1)
m2(X2)
= 0 , (43)
for any X1 ∈ G
Θ and Y1 ∈ G
Θ \ {X1} . Similarly, it is obtained:∑
X1∈GΘ
r21(X2, X1)r12(X1, X2)
m1(X1)
= m2(X2) , (44)
for any X2 ∈ GΘ .
Since r12(X1, X2) = 0 or r21(X2, X1) = 0 when X1 6= X2, it comes from equations (42) and (44):
r12(X1, X1)r21(X1, X1)
m2(X1)
= m1(X1) for any X1 ∈ G
Θ ,
and
r21(X2, X2)r12(X2, X2)
m1(X2)
= m2(X2) for any X2 ∈ G
Θ .
As a corollary, and since rij ≤ mi and rij ≤ mj , it comes:
m2(X) 6= 0 ⇐⇒ m1(X) 6= 0 ⇐⇒ r12(X,X) 6= 0 ⇐⇒ r21(X,X) 6= 0 .
Since r12 ≥ 0 and r21 ≥ 0 , it comes from equation (43):
r12(X1, X2) = 0 or r21(X2, Y1) = 0 ,
for any X1, X2 ∈ GΘ and Y1 ∈ GΘ \ {X1} . By applying this result to X2 = Y1 and X2 6= X1, it is derived
r12(X1, X2) = 0 when m2(X2) 6= 0 . Since anyway 0 ≤ r12(X1, X2) ≤ m2(X2), it follows the result:
r12(X1, X2) = 0 for any X1, X2 ∈ G
Θ such that X1 6= X2 .
Similarly, it may be proved:
r21(X2, X1) = 0 for any X1, X2 ∈ G
Θ such that X1 6= X2 .
As a consequence:
r12(X,X) =
∑
X1∈GΘ
r12(X1, X) = m2(X) =
∑
X1∈GΘ
r21(X,X1)
= r21(X,X) =
∑
X2∈GΘ
r21(X2, X) = m1(X) .
Belief sharpening – property 14 – Bel1 ⊳ Bel2 implies Bel1 ≤ Bel2 .
Proof. Let r12 be a sharpening from Bel1 to Bel2 . Since:{
(Y1, Y2)
/
Y2 ⊆ Y1 ⊆ X
}
⊆
{
(Y1, Y2)
/
Y2 ⊆ Y1 and Y2 ⊆ X
}
,
it comes:
Bel1(X) =
∑
Y1:Y1⊆X
∑
Y2:Y2⊆Y1
r12(Y1, Y2) ≤
∑
Y2:Y2⊆X
∑
Y1:Y2⊆Y1
r12(Y1, Y2) = Bel2(X) .
Neutral element – property 18 – m⊕H ν exists, and m⊕H ν = m .
Proof. Since
∑
Y fo(Y, Z) = ν(Z) and fo ≥ 0 , it is deduced fo(Y, Z) = 0 unless Z = Ω. Now, since∑
Z fo(Y, Z) = m(Y ), it is concluded:
fo(Y,Ω) = m(Y ) and fo(Y, Z) = 0 for Z 6= Ω .
Since this function obviously satisfies the constraints, the existence of m ⊕H ν is implied. Then the result
m⊕H ν = m is immediate.
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Conservation of belief – property 19 – Bel1 ⊳ Bel1 ⊕H Bel2 .
Proof. By definition, m1 ⊕H m2(X) =
∑
V,W :V ∩W=X fo(V,W ) , where fo is an optimal solution to (9).
As a consequence, m1 ⊕H m2(X) =
∑
V r(V,X) , where:
r(V,X) =
∑
W :V ∩W=X
fo(V,W ) .
Now r verifies r(V,X) = 0 for X 6⊂ V and, since
∑
W fo(V,W ) = m1(V ), it comes:∑
X
r(V,X) =
∑
X,W :V ∩W=X
fo(V,W ) =
∑
W
fo(V,W ) = m1(V ) .
Corollaries are obvious.
Probabilistic bound – property 23 –
Proof. The existence of Bel1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H Bels ⊕H P is a consequence of the combination of dominated belief
function, since, indeed, P ⊳ P .
From the conservation of belief, it happens:
P ⊳ Bel1 ⊕H · · · ⊕H Bels ⊕H P .
Since P is a probability measure, it is minimal and the property is implied.
Idempotence – property 26 – m is probabilistic ⇒ m⊕H · · · ⊕H m = m.
Proof. Since m is probabilistic, there are X1:n ∈ GΘ \ {∅} such that:
n∑
j=1
m(Xj) = 1 and
{
i 6= j ⇒ Xi ∩Xj = ∅ ,⋃n
j=1Xj = Ω .
As a consequence, the only function f , which fulfills the constraint of (9), is defined by:
f(X, · · · , X) = m(X) for any X ∈ GΘ .
Of this, the property is an immediate consequence.
B Proofs of section 8 and 9
Bla exclusivity – property 44 –
Proof. It is noticed that E ∩ F ( E or E ∩ F ( F when E 6= F . Then, the proof is achieved by deriving:
(J)vE ∧ (J)vF ≡ [J ]vE ∧ [J ]vF ∧

 ∧
G(E
¬[J ]vG

 ∧

 ∧
H(F
¬[J ]vH

 ,
and combining it with [J ]vE ∧ [J ]vF ≡ [J ](vE ∧ vF ) ≡ [J ]v(E ∩ F ) .
Bla exhaustivity – property 45 –
Proof. The proof is recursive.
It is first noticed that [J ]v∅ = (J)v∅ .
Now, let E ⊆ P and assume
∨
G⊆F (J)vG = [J ]vF for any F ( E .
Then: ∨
F⊆E
(J)vF ≡ (J)vE ∨

 ∨
F(E
∨
G⊆F
(J)vG

 ≡ (J)vE ∨

 ∨
F(E
[J ]vF

 .
It follows
∨
F⊆E(J)vF ≡ [J ]vE ∨
(∨
F(E [J ]vF
)
, from the difinition of (J)vE.
Since the modality is non-decreasing, it is deduced
∨
F⊆E(J)vF ≡ [J ]vE .
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Computing the combination – property 49 and lemma 51 –
Proof of lemma. From (23), (20) and axiom Ind, applied on J ∪K, it comes:∨
F∩G⊆E
([J ]vF ∧ [K]vG) ≡ [J ∪K]vE .
Then, by [J ]vF ≡
∨
F2⊆F
(J)vF2 and [K]vG ≡
∨
G2⊆G
(K)vG2 , it comes:
[J ∪K]E ≡
∨
F∩G⊆E
∨
F2⊆F
∨
G2⊆G
((J)vF2 ∧ (K)vG2) ≡
∨
F2∩G2⊆E
((J)vF2 ∧ (K)vG2) .
Main proof. From the definition of the bla and lemma, it is deduced:
(J ∪K)E ≡
∨
F∩G⊆E
((J)vF ∧ (K)vG) ∧ ¬
∨
F∩G(E
((J)vF ∧ (K)vG) .
The propositions (J)vF ∧ (K)vG constituting a partition, it comes:
(J ∪K)E ≡
∨
F∩G=E
((J)vF ∧ (K)vG) .
Axioms verification – property 54 –
Proof sketch. Partition, K, N and Inc are almost immediate from the definition. Axiom K is derived from
the definition of [J ] · · · and from the property:
⋂
j∈J
Ej ⊆ (⊤ \X) ∪ Y and
⋂
j∈J
Ej ⊆ X imply
⋂
j∈J
Ej ⊆ X ∩ Y ⊆ Y .
Axiom Ind follows from the following derivation:
[J ∪K]vE =
⋃
p0∈P
⋃
EI\(J∪K)
⋃
EJ∪K :
⋂
j∈J∪K Ej⊆E
φ(p0, E1:n)
=
⋃
p0∈P
⋃
EI\(J∪K)
⋃
F∩G⊆E
⋃
EJ∪K :
{⋂
j∈J Ej ⊆ F⋂
j∈K Ej ⊆ G
φ(p0, E1:n) .
At last, axiom T is derived from the following derivation based on hypothesis (35):
[J ]vE =
⋃
p0∈P
⋃
EI\J
⋃
EJ :
⋂
j∈J Ej⊆E
φ(p0, E1:n) =
⋃
p0∈E
⋃
EI\J
⋃
EJ :
⋂
j∈J Ej⊆E
φ(p0, E1:n)
⊆
⋃
p0∈E
⋃
EI
φ(p0, E1:n) = vE ,
and from the property [J ]X = [J ]vπ(X) , where π(X) =
∨
E⊆P:E⊆X E .
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